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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAN AND ANIMALS.

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“Les animaux ne diffèrent de l'homme que du plus au moins.”

CONDILLAC, *Traité des Animaux*, ii, 4.

EVEN upon the free admission of the most eminent and candid supporters of Mr. Darwin, we are not yet compelled to accept as *proved* the Darwinian hypothesis of gradual development. But all calm and earnest inquirers ought to express their complete dissent from the methods usually adopted in order to overthrow it. When it was first propounded, the clergy in general, and even philosophers raised a cry, as though an attempt had been made to attack humanity in its inmost shrine of sacredness; and though they had never seen an ape in their lives, except perhaps in the cage of a menagerie, they mounted their highest horses and declaimed indefinitely about Intellect, Soul, Understanding, and Self-consciousness, and all other immanent qualities of mankind, according to the names they receive after being reflected in this or the other philosophical prism.\* All this is beside the question, which affects the organism alone; and certainly, as may easily be shewn, neither the past pedigree nor the future destinies of the human body until the resurrection, are such as to make any man consider it a degradation that the particles which form his mortal body should have been vivified during past ages in the material

\* See Vogt, *Vorlesungen über den Menschen*, § 9. In his second part, which only appeared after this was written, he has examined the question at length. It will be observed that I have not paused to notice such definitions as that “man is a tool-using animal”, “a cooking animal”, etc. If they were true, they would furnish us with no real line of demarcation. But are they true? Can the Tartar, who uses his beefsteak as a saddle before he eats it, be said to cook? And if so, may not the racoon be said to cook, when it dips its food in water? And do not monkeys use cocoa-nuts, boughs of trees, etc., as tools? “The use of fire,” says Bernardin de St. Pierre, “places an infinite distance between men and animals” (*Harm. de la Nature*). But the Dokos, and probably other savages, do not know the use of fire: and similarly, on one side or other, all such definitions break down.

structure of inferior animals. The supposition is not *proved*, and we believe it to be untrue; but it has been opposed on false grounds. It is not degrading to man, it is not against the majesty of God. "It is just as noble a conception of the Deity," says Mr. Darwin, "to believe that he created a few organic forms capable of self-development into other needful forms, as to believe that He required a fresh act of creation to supply the void caused by the action of His laws."

That man is to be classed as a member of the animal kingdom, and not as zoologically distinct from it, is now admitted, although there was a great outcry against Linnæus, when he first gave to the fact a scientific recognition. "Not being able," says Professor Owen, "to appreciate or conceive the distinction between the psychical phenomena of a chimpanzee and of a Boschisman, or of an Aztec with arrested brain growth, as being of a nature to exclude comparison between them, *or as being other than a difference of degree*, I cannot shut my eyes to the significance of that all-pervading similitude of structure—every tooth, every bone, strictly homologous—which makes the determination of the difference between homo and pithecus the anatomist's difficulty. And, therefore, with every respect for the author of the *Records of Creation*, I follow Linnæus and Cuvier in regarding mankind as a legitimate subject of zoological comparison\* and classification."

M. Flourens has most emphatically observed† " *Un intervalle profond, sans liaison, sans passage, sépare l'espèce humaine de toutes les autres espèces. Aucune autre n'est voisine de l'espèce humaine, aucun genre même, aucune famille.*" That there is between man and animals an enormous difference in *degree*, no one dreams of denying. As Buffon says, "Le plus stupide des hommes suffit pour conduire le plus spirituel des animaux, il le commande et le fait servir, et c'est moins par force et par adresse que par supériorité de nature, et parce-qu'il a un projet raisonné, un ordre d'actions et une suite de moyens par lesquels il contraint l'animal à lui obéir."‡ But when we pass from differences of *degree* to differences of *kind*,§ it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to point out any satisfactory, definite, and pre-

\* On the Character of the Class Mammalia, p. 20, n., Mem. of British Association, 1857.

† Éloge de Blumenbach, Mém. de l'Institut, t. xxi. Linnæus, on the other hand, whose *Homo Lar* is the grand gibbon of Buffon, calls man "*homo sapiens*", and the chimpanzee (for clearly his description must refer to the chimpanzee) "*homo troglodytes*". Both Rousseau and Burnet considered orangs to be men. See Godron, ii, 117.

‡ Hist. Nat., ii, 438. See Aug. Carlier, De l'esclavage, p. 11, seq.

§ Even Porphyry thought that animals differ from man in degree only, not in essence. De Abstinencia. See Pouchet, De la Plur. de Races Hum., ch. ii.

cise line of demarcation between the human race and inferior animals. The difference, in other words, is quantitative, and not, so far as we can yet see, essentially qualitative.

Let us very briefly examine some of the suggested differences between them, passing over all those more trifling ones which, even if they were established, would not amount to an essential and generic difference. The examination is all the more necessary, because few subjects have been more disguised than this by ignorance and prejudice and their invariable concomitants, arrogant assertion and obstinate refusal to observe the facts.

1. Buffon says, "Whatever be the resemblance between the Hottentot and the ape, the interval which separates them is immense, since it is filled up interiorly by Thought\*, and exteriorly by Language." "The plant," says Is. Geoff. St. Hilaire, "lives; the animal lives and feels; the man lives, feels, and thinks."

Yet it is impossible, as even Buffon admits, to refuse to allow to animals at least an analogon of thought, or, as M. de Quatrefages expresses it, a rudimentary intelligence. To prove this would be to copy out whole volumes of authentic narratives respecting various animals. Dr. Yvan, in his account of a tame orang of Borneo, mentions that one day he took a little girl, examined her in the most attentive physiological manner with the greatest gentleness, and then retiring into a corner, with a most puzzled expression, meditated for a considerable time. A dog, which is searching for its master, will come to a place where three roads meet, and after smelling at two of them will take the third *without stopping to trace the scent*, because an exhaustive and perfect syllogism has proved to him that it is unnecessary to do so. Borlase† narrates to us that he once saw a lobster trying to get an oyster. Everytime, however, the lobster tried to insert its claw the oyster closed its shell and frustrated the attempt; at last the lobster picked up a little pebble and when next the oyster opened its shell dropped it in, and so attained his object. The necrophorus in order to get at a dead animal at the top of a stick, will *undermine* the stick and so bring the animal down. Streud's cat, when it began to feel the exhaustion of air in his air-pump, would put its paw over the valve and so stop its action. An elephant was seen to pick up a sixpence which was beyond his reach by blowing it violently against the wall until it had recoiled within the length of his trunk. Cuvier tells us that, when a rope was shortened with knots in order to prevent the orang-outang at Paris from letting itself down to unlock a door, the

\* Hence the very root of the word man, Sanskr. *manudscha*, Goth. *manniska*, Germ. *mensch*, etc., is "man", to think. Grimm, *Über d. Urspr. d. Sprache*, § 121.

† See Thompson's *Passions of Animals*.

creature observing that his weight only drew the knots tighter, climbed up *above* them, and so untied them.

After these cases, which might be *indefinitely* multiplied, who shall deny Thought even to a crustacean? who will venture to say with Descartes,\* “la bête n’est qu’un automate, une pure machine?” or, who will refuse to admit with Milton respecting animals that—

“They also *know*,  
And *reason*, not contemptibly”;

and with Dr. Brown that they exhibit the evident marks “of reasoning—of reasoning which I cannot but think as unquestionable as the instincts that mingle with it.” The instincts of animals adapt themselves to varying circumstances, and therefore Coleridge† rightly concludes that their instinctive intelligence “is not different in kind from understanding, or the faculty which judges according to sense in man.”

The definition of man, then, as a “reasonable animal,” and the attempt to establish a generic difference between that which in animals is called “instinct,” and in man “reason,” falls to the ground. Instinct, as Comte‡ pointed out, is “a spontaneous impulse in a determinate direction, independent of any foreign influence; and, therefore, there is instinct in man as much or more than in brutes.” If, on the other hand, intelligence be defined as the aptitude to modify conduct in conformity to the circumstances of the case—which is the main practical attitude of reason proper—it is more evident than before that the difference between men and animals is only in degree of development. Comte considers that this perversion of the word instinct is a remnant of the automatic hypothesis of Descartes; and in a few pregnant remarks he shows the truth of that which has also been stated by Professor Huxley§, that “the essential processes of reasoning are exerted by the higher order of brutes as completely and effectively as by ourselves.” The ideal|| fixity of instinct, which is

\* Des Cartes, *Disc. de la Méthode*, ed. Cousin, i, 184-190.

+ Aids to Reflection, i, 193, sixth edition. Sidney Smith a little understates matters when he says “I feel myself so much at ease about the superiority of mankind; I have such a marked and decided contempt for the understanding of every baboon I have ever seen, I feel so sure that the blue ape without a tail will never rival us in painting, poetry, or music, that I see no reason whatever why justice may not be done to *the few fragments of soul and tatters of understanding* which they may really possess.” This passage is exquisitely humorous, but it rather tends to conceal the *real nature* of the serious question, What is the distinguishing mark between men and animals?

‡ Comte, *Phil. Pos.*, v, 6; Martineau’s trans., i, 465. Dr. Darwin long ago saw the same truth. *Zoonomia*, i, 256.

§ Huxley, *Lectures*, p. 57. See, too, Lyell’s *Antiquity of Man*, p. 495.

|| Even F. Cuvier (*Dict. des Sciences Nat.*, xxiii, 532), Flourens (*De l’Instinct et de l’Intelligence des Animaux*), and Godron (*De l’Espèce*, ii, 131), appear to endorse this positive error as to the unalterableness of instinct. Instinct is no

supposed to characterise animals, is, as Leroy has proved, the mere error of inattentive observers; and instead of patiently exploring the moral and intellectual nature of animals, men have jumped at once to a contemptuous and erroneous opinion which has blinded their eyes to innumerable facts. Man has looked at the animals only through\* the deceitful prism of his own pride, and his own unreasoning individuality.

2. Nor, again, can we deny to animals a species of *language*, or *διάλεκτος*, as Plato calls it, although Max Müller considers language a Rubicon which animals can never cross. It is true that the language may be rudimentary, and mainly composed of interjections; it is true it may be the expression of mere feeling,† rather than of free intelligence, yet it differs from human speech neither in its mechanical production nor in its object and results.‡ To prove this was the object of several of those books§ which were written to refute the wonderful automaton-theory of Descartes. To all intents and purposes animals *do* possess language, and some of them even a power of articulation, which may be proved by many anecdotes. When bees have lost their queen the first that discovers the fact informs the whole hive by crossing and tapping the antennæ of all which it meets. Dr. Franklin found some ants eating treacle. He shook them out, and hung the pot by a string from the ceiling. Only one ant had been left in the pot. This crawled up the string, across the ceiling, and down the wall, and then informed the rest who immediately thronged to the treacle till it was all devoured. A surgeon at Leeds bandaged and cured the leg of a dog which had been lamed. The dog attended every day till it was cured, and after three months brought with it another lame dog to request the same assistance. "Parrots," says Archbishop Whately, "can be taught not only to pronounce words, but to pronounce them with some general meaning of what they utter." "All ears," says Professor Wilson, "can correspond to the cultivated utterances of domestic animals, and especially to the varying tones of the dog. Its whine, its bay, its whimper, its bark, its yelp, its growl, its snarl, its snap, its howl, are

more unalterable in animals than it is in man. That animals have *intelligence*, as well as *instinct*, has been admitted by Locke, *Essay on Underst.*, ii, 11, Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais*, ii, 16, Condillac, *Traité des Animaux*, p. 36, Leroy, *Lettres Philosophiques*, p. 5, etc. Réaumur, etc. (quoted by Godron, *l.c.*), as well as by the authorities already adduced. For some good remarks on *instinct*, see Dr. Whewell, *Hist. of the Ind. Sciences*, i, 615, seq.

\* Cornay, *Anthrop.*, p. 16.

† Heyse, *Syst. der Sprachwissenschaft*, 25-33.

‡ De Quatrefages, *loc. cit.*

§ Such as those of Fabr. de Aquapendente, and of Drechseler, and of Rechtenbach, *De Sermone Brutorum*; Crocius (1676), and Klemm (1704), *De Animâ Brutorum*; J. Stahl, *Logice Brutorum*, Hamb., 1697; Le Père Bonjeant, *Amusements Phil. sur le Langage des Bêtes*, La Haye, 1739, etc.

each distinct utterances, and every one of these names is a word directly derived from this dog-language." A dog can easily understand his master, and Gall humorously remarks that his dog knew English, French, and German, having acquired the latter with great rapidity. So too a master "can tell from the tone of a dog's bark, when it is greeting an acquaintance, threatening an intruder, repelling a beggar, or whether it is only indulging in that liberty of speech which is the birthright of every civilised dog, and taking an abstract bark at things in general."\* We conclude, then, with Archbishop Whately† that "Man is *not* the only animal that can make use of language to express what is passing within his mind, and can understand, more or less, what is so expressed by another."

3. Nor, again, does the possession of a *power of abstraction*, as Locke‡ supposed, furnish any generic difference between man and brute. In the first place, there are many savage tribes among whom the power of abstraction can be barely said to exist at all, or only in the feeblest measure. The Iroquois§ have no generic word for "good;" the Mohicans no verb for "I love;" the Chinese no word for "brother;" the Malay no word for "tree" or for "colour;" the Australians no word for "bird;" the Esquimaux no word for "fishing;" though each of these languages has a host of specific words for each separate kind of tree, bird, fish, &c. Then again, conversely, who has ever proved that beasts have no power of abstraction? no conception, for instance, of the generic "man," or of "colour," or of "whiteness?" What right have we to base a distinction on an assumption so completely unproven? And if, putting the remark in a slightly different form, we say with Plato|| that man is the only animal who counts, we are again confronted by the facts that many savage nations have only the feeblest conception of number, and cannot count beyond three or four; while, on the other hand, the more intelligent animals frequently act in a manner

\* Prehistoric Man, i, 83. There is even reason to believe that barking is an acquired language (Rev. de Deux Mondes, Fevr. 1861). Prichard, Nat. Hist. of Man, p. 83, ed. Norris.

† On Instinct, Dublin, 1847. Even Lucretius saw that practically a dog can speak (v, 1048).

‡ Essay on the Human Understanding, II, xi, 10, quoted and approved by Max Müller, Lectures, p. 342. M. Hollard denies to animals all conception of time and space (De l'Homme, p. 78). What is the value of such an assertion as this? Such was also the view of Ballanche, "La Faculté d'abstraire a été refusée à la bête", Palingénésie, p. 175; and of Bonnet, "Les Animaux ne généralisent point leurs idées", Princ. Phil., v, 2. See Charma, Sur le Lang., p. 190.

§ See Farrar, Origin of Lang., pp. 47, 107; Crawford, Malay Dict., i, 68, seq.; Latham, Var. of Man, p. 376; De Quatrefages, Rev. de Deux Mondes, Dec. 15, 1860; Maury, La Terre et l'Homme, p. 433; Du Ponceau, Gram., p. 120, etc.

|| Epinosis. Plato's other point of difference (Legg., ii) that man is the only animal that dances and sings, is not true, and if it were would be insignificant.

which shows that they are not without this rudimentary sense of numerical relations.

4. Nor, certainly, does man differ from animals in *anatomic structure*, as Helvetius\* asserted. On the contrary, anatomy "has proved an absolute identity of anatomic composition—bone for bone, muscle for muscle, vessel for vessel, nerve for nerve. Some variations of volume, of dimension, of arrangement in harmony with the exterior forms, constitute almost the only differences. In proportion as the means of investigation have become more numerous and more powerful, the approach has become more close;" and chemistry, and physiology, even when they work with the microscope, carry the identity still farther than anatomy.† To find some real essential point of difference between the structure of man and of the ape, has been called the main difficulty of the anatomist; and Linnæus, who was always straightforward and honest, said long ago, "Nullum characterem hactenus eruere potui unde homo a simia internoscatur."

5. Nor, again, does the difference consist in man's *vertical position*, which penguins and some ducks share with him; to say nothing of the frequency with which that position is assumed by the higher apes.

6. Nor yet, again, in *affections, ‡ passions, and the faculties of the heart*. On the contrary, animals closely resemble men in moral character. They love, hate, attend to their offspring, have permanent feuds and fast friendships, are clever and stupid, profit or fail to profit by education, and show most decided individuality. We have all known affectionate, grateful, and caressing dogs, as well as surly, jealous, misanthropic, passionate dogs; conceited dogs and humble dogs, gentlemanly dogs and rude dogs. Nay, more; the most decided differences of character may be at any time observed in a single flock of chickens. Some of them are greedy, and others selfish; some of them generous, and others mean; some brave, and others cowardly; some of them lively, and others morose.

7. Nor, again, is it in the *expression § of emotions*. Milton, indeed, speaks of the

\* Helvetius, De l'Esprit, i, 1, note a. "L'organisation de la bête est de beaucoup inférieure à la nôtre."

† Godron, De l'Espèce, ii, 112; De Quatrefages, l. c. Dec. 1860, p. 825. Compare Vogt, Vorlesungen, § 145, who places side by side a human brain and one of a chimpanzee, adding "Man vergleiche und staune!" On the whole subject, see Huxley, Lectures, p. 6; Cornay, De l'Unité, p. 16; Godron, ii, 110-139; Charma, Ess. sur la Langage, 30, 189; Lyell, Ant. of Man, p. 493; Hollard, 78-86.

‡ De Quatrefages, l. c. See, too, Maupertuis, Sur l'âme des Bêtes, Amsterd. 1728.

§ See the quotation from Grant and Lawrence in Pouchet, De la Plur., ch. ii.



"Smile which from reason flows,  
To brute denied."

But the orang "is capable of a kind of laugh when pleasantly excited," and it is certain that there are other animals which both laugh and cry.

8. Nor does it consist, as so many philosophers\* have asserted rather than proved, in *self-consciousness*. "Les animaux," says M. Flourens, "sentent, connaissent, pensent; mais l'homme est le seul de tous les êtres créés à qui ce pouvoir ait été donné de sentir qu'il sent, de connaître qu'il connaît, et de penser qu'il pense." But how can this be proved? Animals, certainly, have an individualised† perception, a *sensorium commune*; they are certainly as conscious as man is of their own material being; and although Comte truly says that we shall never know what goes on in an animal's brain, yet it requires no wonderful knowledge to be sure that any individual cat (for instance), though it may not be able to say "I," is not in the habit of mistaking itself for any other cat! The individuality of animals is often as intense and energetic as that of men; and if conceit, pride, and shyness be signs of self-consciousness, it must exist in some animals to a very remarkable extent.

9. Nor does *perfectibility*, or "improveable reason," constitute a difference. "L'animal ne progresse pas," says Buffon,‡ "l'homme est perfectible." Both propositions are questionable. Some animals *can* be educated, can be improved in sagacity, and trained into a thousand useful and cleanly habits; in other words, they are capable of progress and growth in intelligence; as, for instance, in the case of the dog, as every one is aware who has ever trained or observed one! And, on the contrary, some men show the gift of perfectibility to a very slight degree, and evince, as has been abundantly proved, a deeply-seated inaptitude for real civilisation, which excludes the application of the word "perfectibility" to them, except in a sense in which it may also be applied to the more intelligent animals.‡

10. Nor, again, does the difference consist in the possession of *moral perceptions*. Aristotle was demonstrably mistaken in saying§ that man alone has the sentiment of good and evil, of justice and injustice. Animals show all the virtues and all the vices. They|| are

\* Die intellectuelle Anlage, und die Fähigkeit der Selbstbetrachtung, deren das thier unfähig ist. Burmeister, *Gesch. d. Schöpfung*, § 406, etc.

† Pouchet, *l. c.*; Comte, *Philos. Pos.*, v, ch. 6.

‡ Buffon, *Introd. à l'Hist. de l'Homme*. So, too, Archbp. Sumner, *Records of Creation*, ii, 2.

§ Aristotle, *Polit.*, i, 2.

|| Zimmermann, *Der Mensch.*, § 46.

faithful, obedient, attached, good-natured, grateful; and, on the other hand, they are false, revengeful, obstinate, artful. And, as a necessary consequence of this, they clearly possess a *conscience*. What careful observer of animals has not noticed the misery of a dog who goes about with a guilty conscience? He knows as well as possible that he has done wrong, and betrays by his motions that he is penitent and ashamed. And even if this were not so—if animals betrayed *no* sense of morality—are there not men, tribes and nations of men, of whom the same is true? Is it necessary to pause, even for a moment, to prove that there have been even civilised nations whose notions of morality were so confused, or so obliterated, as to cause them to regard with approval or indifference suicide and murder, adultery and theft?

11. Again, animals display powers of memory and of will. They can and do profit by experience. They have a sense of playfulness exhibited in a way which shows the influence of imagination; they act in a manner which often proves distinct recognition of the relation between cause and effect; some of their actions are marked by hypocrisy and deceitfulness; sometimes they have been known to exercise remarkable powers of invention; they frequently show themselves able to compute time, and sometimes manifest a sense of number; their astonishment and their sympathy are often expressed as clearly as though they had articulate utterance. These are not assertions, but facts; nor are they founded on doubtful stories in Pliny and Ælian\*, but on well-authenticated cases, for which I refer the curious reader to the excellent book of Mr. Thompson on the *Passions of Animals*; a book which will afford him the strongest possible confirmation of every argument which we have here adduced.

12. Does the difference, then, consist in a *sense of religion*? This is the conclusion of M. de Quatrefages, who would define man, in his distinction from the brute, as “an organised being, living, feeling, moving spontaneously, endowed with morality and a sense of religion (religiosité).” We have seen that “morality” may be struck out of this definition; nor is “religiosity” at all a satisfactory criterion. If animals are not insensible to the broad outlines of the moral law, can we deny them that (of course rudimentary) sense of religion, which perhaps can only exist in the union of the intellectual faculties with a sense of right and wrong. Is there, at any rate, any proof, or shadow of proof, that it does not exist in *some* animals? Is there, again, any proof, or shadow of proof, that it exists in any higher degree in *all* men? Religion among some tribes seems to resolve itself into a

\* See Pliny, viii, 30; Solinus, vii, x1; Ælian, iii, 10, vii, 22, xvi, 15, xvii, *passim*; Michaelis, *De Origine Linguae*, p. 140. seq.; Vogt, *Vorlesungen*, § 255.

mere dread of the unknown; and this exists among the more intelligent animals, especially, as has been noticed so frequently, in the horse and the dog. A dog in the possession of Professor Vogt's father exhibited the liveliest terror at the presence of a ghost in the shape of a phosphorescent tree.

13. I have not entered on the question whether animals have a *soul*; and probably, after all that has been said, the inquiry would be useless. If the soul be an Entelechy, as Aristotle asserted; if it be, as Plato said, that which displays itself in three energies—the rational, the irascible, and the appetitive; if, with some modern philosophers, we regard it as “that inferior part of our intellectual nature, which shows itself in the phenomena of dreaming, and which is connected with the state of the brain;” if, as Aristotle in another place defines it, it be “that by which we live, feel, or perceive, move, and understand;” if it be the ego or the sum of its faculties; if its essence reside in thought, in sensation, or in will; if it be, as Reid defined it, “the principle of thought;” if it be “a self-moving force” or “incorporate spirit;” if it be, in short, anything which you like to call it, who will assert, or rather who will prove, that animals have no soul? It is no part of my task here to inquire what the soul is, and I have merely taken the readiest definitions that came to hand\*: but does any one of these definitions, or all of them put together, furnish a *proved and specific characteristic* of the genus Man? Did not the feeling that such is *not* the case lead to the automatic theory of Descartes, Polignac, and Priestley on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to the beliefs of Father Bongéant and French, that they were acted on by spirits, and of Newton and Hancock, that their actions are directly due to the agency of the Creator?

14. Finally, then, is *immortality* the distinguishing point? Here, again, who shall venture to say? If no one but a rash man would venture to assert that *any* animals *are* immortal, would any one be less rash who should take upon himself to declare positively that *no* animals *can* be? Certain it is, that the moral and physical analogies led Bishop Butler to regard a future life for animals as resulting from some of the same general arguments as those which have weight in establishing the immortality† of man. The great bishop deprecates all difficulties on the score of the manner in which animals are to be hereafter dealt with, as wholly founded in our ignorance; neverthe-

\* See Fleming, Vocab. of Philos., s. v., and p. 263.

† It is, however, observable that in the Bible, *ψυχή* is used for animal life, and *πνοή*, *πνεῦμα*, for the life of men. For the well known passage of Butler, see Analogy, ch. i: “But it is said that these observations are equally applicable to brutes,” etc.

less I cannot refrain from here quoting a powerful passage from Mr. Ruskin to show what moral reason we have for not denying that brutes also may be destined for a future existence. The doctrine of immortality is deeply mingled with that of future retribution; and Mr. Ruskin asks, "Can any man entirely account for all that happens to a cab-horse? Has he ever looked fairly at the fate of one of these beasts as it is dying? measured the work it has done, and the reward it has got? put his hand upon the bloody wounds through which its bones are piercing, and so looked up to heaven with an entire understanding of heaven's ways about the horse? Yet the horse is a fact—no dream—no revelation among the myrtle trees by night; and the dust it lies upon, and the dogs that eat it, are facts; and yonder happy person, whose the horse was till its knees were broken over the hurdles, who had an immortal soul to begin with, and peace and wealth to help forward his immortality, . . . this happy person shall have no stripes—shall have only the horse's fate of annihilation; or if other things are indeed reserved for him, heaven's kindness or omnipotence is to be doubted therefore."

To those who think over this passage, it will not appear irrelevant in the present discussion, and it may perhaps show the possibility of a doubt whether the destinies even of the future be reserved for man alone. Even Leibnitz, regarding individual permanence as no exclusive privilege of man, extended it to animals also, attributing "indefectibility" to them, while he reserved the word immortality to paint the higher possibilities of man.

That man is almost immeasurably removed from animals in the degree of development which their several faculties have attained, has never been disputed. But "no difference in degree can constitute a difference in kind;" and if it be asked "What is the generic point of distinction between men and animals?" the answer must still be, *Natura non agit saltatim*; there is no such point of distinction; man does not form an order apart from the rest of the animal world; he is linked to that world by humiliating, but indissoluble ties of resemblance and connection; and even the matter which constitutes both *his* body and that of animals is but the same as that which goes to the composition of the inorganic world.

PHILALETHES.

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